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How	the	economics	profession	got	it	wrong	on	Brexit
Some	of	the	most	widely	cited	predictions	of	the	economic	effects	of	Brexit	rely
on	flawed	analysis,	particularly	of	the	performance	of	the	UK	after	it	joined	the
EEC,	and	on	the	link	between	trade	and	productivity,	write	Ken	Coutts	(left),
Graham	Gudgin	(University	of	Cambridge)	and	Jordan	Buchanan
(right)	(Ulster	University	Economic	Policy	Centre).	In	order	to	restore	public
confidence	in	economic	forecasting	for	major	policy	issues,	economists	need	to
use	more	relevant	analyses,	based	on	a	wider	range	of	evidence.
The	Brexit	debate	has	been	distorted	by	several	myths.	One	of	the	most	persistent	and	widely	repeated	is	that	the
economic	performance	of	the	UK	improved	after	joining	the	EEC	in	1973.	This	claim	was	made	by	the	OECD	and
was	regularly	stated	in	the	media	during	the	Brexit	referendum	campaign.	The	link	between	trade	and	productivity
also	plays	an	important	role	in	economists’	assessments	of	the	economic	performance	of	the	UK	within	the	EU,	and
the	short-term	and	long-term	economic	effects	of	the	referendum	decision	to	leave	the	EU.
Many	of	these	assessments	have	been	by	government	departments	and	international	agencies.	In	estimating	the
economic	effects	of	Brexit	on	living	standards,	these	rely	on	a	range	of	analytic	approaches,	including	the	use	of
gravity	models,	computable	general	equilibrium	models	and	macroeconomic	forecasting	models.
Front	pages	celebrate	the	UK’s	entry	into	the	EEC	in	1973,	a	time	of	fuel	shortages.	Photo:	Paul
Townsend	via	a	CC-BY-SA	2.0	licence
In	our	working	paper,	we	conclude	that	much	of	this	work	contains	flaws	of	analysis,	and	a	treatment	of	evidence	that
leads	to	exaggerated	costs	of	Brexit.	Gravity	models	are	well	established	as	a	technique	for	estimating	the	impact	of
trade	associations	or	currency	unions	but	require	more	care	than	has	been	in	shown,	when	being	applied	to	a
specific	issue	like	Brexit.	The	Treasury	has	been	particularly	cavalier	in	its	approach,	both	in	its	application	of	gravity
analysis	and	in	applying	a	‘knock-on’	impact	from	trade	to	productivity.	Other	organisations	have	been	a	little	more
circumspect	about	the	productivity	link,	which	we	doubt	exists	to	any	significant	degree	for	advanced	economies,	but
several	have	used	it	without	much	questioning.	The	short-term	forecasts	which	have	turned	out	to	be	wrong	have
further	damaged	confidence	in	economists’	contributions	to	public	debate.
Partly	as	a	result,	very	little	attention	is	currently	being	given	by	politicians	or	the	public	on	either	side	of	the	debate
to	the	impact	assessments	published	at	the	time	of	the	referendum.	The	potential	damage	to	the	UK’s	negotiating
position	on	Brexit	may	have	been	limited	by	the	indifference	of	policy-makers	to	economic	impact	assessments.
Although	the	UK	government	has	steered	away	from	further	work	on	economic	assessments	of	Brexit,	devolved
governments	have	felt	less	constrained.
LSE Brexit: How the economics profession got it wrong on Brexit Page 1 of 2
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-08
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/08/how-the-economics-profession-got-it-wrong-on-brexit/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	Mayor	of	London,	reacting	against	the	UK	Government’s	reluctance	to	publish	assessments,	commissioned
Cambridge	Econometrics,	who	showed	that	a	modelling	approach	without	gravity	models	or	general	equilibrium,	will
generate	moderate	and	plausible	results.	Even	so,	only	the	most	pessimistic	of	their	conclusions	on	Brexit	received
any	publicity.	CE’s	gave	little	attention	to	their	prediction	that	per	capita	GVA	was	little	changed	by	Brexit	and	hence
the	media	ignored	it.
The	Scottish	Government	was	much	less	inhibited	and	ploughed	ahead	with	an	analysis	incorporating	all	of	the	flaws
in	the	Treasury	and	CEP	analyses	with	no	acknowledgement	of	published	criticisms.	The	consequences	of	these
shortcomings	go	well	beyond	Brexit	itself.
We	believe	that	the	credibility	of	the	economic	forecasting	profession	and	some	of	the	major	parts	of	the	economic
press,	have	been	damaged	again.	It	will	take	more	than	a	decade	to	be	sure	of	this,	but	the	failure	of	the	short-term
forecasts	indicates	what	could	happen.	The	fact	that	the	flaws	we	identify	all	point	in	the	direction	of	pessimism	on
Brexit,	and	hence	in	the	direction	that	most	academics	and	economists	tend	to	lean	ideologically,	will	increase	the
scepticism	of	many.	The	refusal	of	the	Treasury	to	discuss	their	approach,	at	least	until	the	issue	was	aired	in
Parliament,	is	in	our	view	unacceptable	in	an	open	democracy.
Our	conclusion	is	that	in	order	to	restore	public	confidence	in	economic	forecasting	for	major	policy	issues	like	Brexit,
economists	need	to	use	more	relevant	analyses,	based	on	a	wider	range	of	evidence.	We	expect	that	econometric
models	used	by	commercial	forecasters	like	Cambridge	Econometrics,	will	prove	to	be	most	accurate	in	the	long-run.
If	so,	the	academic	profession	needs	to	reconsider	both	the	relevance	of	its	current	attachment	to	theory	based	on
unrealistic	assumptions,	and	to	the	general	quality	of	policy-relevant	applied	work.
Whatever	techniques	are	used	need	to	be	applied	with	more	balance	and	scepticism.	The	CEP	in	discussing	the
Treasury	reports	could	only	think	of	changes	which	would	have	made	the	HMT	predictions	even	more	pessimistic	on
Brexit.	In	the	words	of	Oliver	Cromwell	to	the	General	Assembly	of	the	Church	of	Scotland,	the	economic	forecasting
profession	needs	to	‘think	it	possible	ye	may	be	mistaken’.
Our	conclusion	is	that	most	estimates	of	the	impact	of	Brexit	in	the	UK,	both	short-term	and	long-term,	have
exaggerated	the	degree	of	potential	damage	to	the	UK	economy.	We	stress	at	this	point	that	this	is	not	a	politically-
driven	exercise.	Most	of	the	four-person	team	behind	the	research	for	this	and	our	other	papers	voted	‘Remain’	in	the
2016	referendum	and	would	do	so	again	if	given	the	chance.	Our	purpose	is	rather	to	establish	a	sound	basis	for	the
ongoing	debate	on	the	likely	potential	economic	impact	of	Brexit,	and	more	generally	to	question	the	quality	of
economic	analysis	in	dealing	with	major,	macroeconomic	policy	issue	like	Brexit.
This	is	an	edited	extract	from	‘How	the	economics	profession	got	it	wrong	on	Brexit’,	Working	Paper	493,	Centre	for
Business	Research,	University	of	Cambridge,	January	2018.	It	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of
the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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